Feminist Political Scientist Analyzes Transformations in Iranian Society Today

By Fatemeh Sadeghi, Alborz

Why Don't They Believe It?
. . . Many have tried to present minor or major documents to prove that a great fraud has taken place in this election, and that the results have been rigged in one way or another in favor of a particular candidate. In the following notes, my goal is not to present these documents which are quite considerable. My goal is to present a brief sociological analysis to demonstrate that given the social developments of the past few years, it is highly unlikely that the majority of voters would have voted for Ahmadinejad. Based on many predictions, Iranian society is heading toward a different choice. These developments could be detected even during the June 2005 election which was boycotted or treated with indifference by many who were called the silent majority.

Below, I will demonstrate why part of the voters, whether those who had boycotted the previous presidential election or the silent majority who account for the high rate of voter participation in this election, demanded change. This fact will give credence to the doubts about the announced results of this election. First I will examine some general development in Iran during the past few decades. Then, I will examine Ahmadinejad's cultural and social resume and its effect on people's participation in the recent election. The arguments below are by no means new. I am only emphasizing them as a reminder. Considering these arguments will allow us to better comprehend Iranian society's protests against the recent events and its concerns about the latest trends.

Political disillusionment in post-revolutionary Iran has increased in all the years after the revolution. This phenomenon can be explained by many factors. The most important factor is the inability of the Islamic system to satisfy many of the demands of the middle and lower classes and realize their dreams. I am referring to freedom and social justice in particular. Prominent signs of this political disillusionment can be found in the daily increase in open and hidden forms of opposition. These forms of opposition have continuously increased during the past several years. Two phenomena in the past few years can be considered symbols of this opposition.

One is the increasing use of internet sites as sources for obtaining news and analysis. The other is the increasing use of satellite news and information stations as the most important source of news and analysis inside the country. There has been a turn away from the government's "Voice and Face of Iran." [The name of the Iranian government's television and radio network -- tr.]

The number of internet users in Iran exceeds 25 million [Iran's total population as of 2008 was 72.2 million -- tr.] Despite extreme forms of media censorship, the internet became an important medium for transmitting news, especially during the ninth government [2005-2009 – tr.]. Even many of those who sympathized with the ruling current turned to the internet to obtain news and analysis. It is estimated that there are over 100,000 Persian language weblogs and news and analysis websites. Most are in one way or another critical of the status quo or opposed to it. . . .

Most remember that up until a few years ago, it was not easy to speak of satellite [television –tr.]. I was very surprised to see that intensely religious people in remote areas and in religious cities such as Qom were turning more and more to satellite [television—tr.]. Their earlier reluctance has almost disappeared. The increasing use of the internet and virtual space to obtain information and news reveals that the official ideology cannot satisfy searching and critical minds. During all these years, the government's "Voice and Face of Iran" has emphatically adopted an approach which resists change and underestimates its audience's ability to reason. This approach has resulted in people's disillusionment and their turn to other sources and media for news and analysis.

Political disillusionment revealed itself openly in the voters' behavior. Many voters refused to participate in the June 2005 election because they were not satisfied with the pace of the reforms in Iranian society and expected the reformists and Mohammad Khatami to be more decisive and to take more action in creating changes. However, the rates of disillusionment were even higher in the post-reformist period.

Many reasons can be given for this disillusionment. Here I will only point to reasons which seem to be significant in explaining the general trend toward disillusionment in the years after the revolution and especially in the past four years. The more time elapsed after the Islamic revolution, the more people disembarked the ship of the revolution. However, disillusionment increased at an accelerated rate during the term of the ninth government [2005-2009 tr.] because of the many criticisms of its record, particularly in the realms of culture and the economy. Naturally, this disillusionment reveals itself in the actions of the voters and their choice of a candidate or candidates who call for change, even if the candidate or candidates are not able to satisfy all of the voters' political and social demands.

The increase in literacy and consciousness among Iranians is most important in explaining all the markers of development and especially the disillusionment with the status quo. The literacy rate has increased during all the past few years. University entrance rates have increased considerably in comparison to the past.

Women's increased consciousness is very significant. During the past few years, the majority of university entrants have been women. We have often heard slogans about how women are the educators of humanity. Regardless of the intentions of those who created these slogans, it seems that this statement is undeniably true in Iran. If Iranian women of [the generation -- tr.] prior to the revolution were the educators of the ideological generation which opposed the Shah's regime and engaged in a ceaseless struggle against it, women in post-revolutionary Iran are to be given credit for much of the sociological developments, the rise in consciousness, and the development in methods of educating the young generation. Once faced with barriers to or limitations in their choices for advancement, these women turned to the universities and became determined to raise their consciousness and increase their knowledge.

I cannot say what percentage of the votes for Mousavi or Karroubi were cast by women. What I can say based on my own observations is that women and especially young women constituted the majority of those who voted for reformist candidates and especially Mousavi. Furthermore, their strong presence in the electoral campaigns of both candidates [Mousavi and Karroubi -- tr.] was completely new. Based on my personal observations I can even say that in many cases, the number of women activists at the campaign headquarters of both candidates outweighed that of men. . .

I don't mean to say that women did not vote for Ahmadinejad. However in the last part of this essay I will argue that Ahmadinejad was unable to draw the votes of the majority of women in this election. Even based on my own personal observations in many parts of Iran, it can be said that those who did vote for Ahmadinejad in 2005 did so not for the sake of nuclear energy or other ideological slogans.

They voted for him because of economic problems and because of his electoral slogans about social justice and combating corruption. In all the interviews that I have conducted with women who have voted for Ahmadinejad, not one has referred to his foreign policy and nuclear energy. All unanimously said that they voted for Ahmadinejad because his platform was against corruption and for social justice. Of course many complained that the government had not taken serious steps in this direction, and all complained about the rising prices and other problems, especially drug addiction. They regretted having voted for him.

It seems highly unlikely that the majority of the rural and suburban [poor -- tr.] population would have voted for Ahmadinejad during the last election. Such a vote would be even more questionable in areas populated by ethnic and religious minorities. . .

During these years [2005-2009 tr.] the number of publishers declined. The government has practically set barriers against the publication of useful books. Many books did not receive a publication permit or faced difficulties in receiving republication permits. Many internet sites were blocked. Censorship increased massively in all areas.

The "cultural revolution" that has taken place during the past few years has led to the expulsion of many university students and professors. At all the universities, the government attempted to replace critical professors and students with its own handpicked students and professors. Many students received stars [reference to students who were suspended for being political activists -- tr.]. Some received warnings from national security agencies or were expelled. Many Islamic student councils or other university student councils were closed and many students were arrested or harassed. Another measure taken by the government was to censor textbooks.

The gender quota system for university students was imposed [to limit the number of female students -- tr.] There has been a campaign to limit female university students' choice of campuses to those in their home province. The government's ideological machine was backed by institutions such as the Center for Women and Family Affairs which had proposed plans such as the Family Bill [Reference to bill introduced in the Summer of 2007 which made it more convenient for men to take a second wife. This bill also imposed taxes on a woman's alimony. In September 2008, after much protest by Iranian women's rights activists, the most controversial aspects of this bill were removed --tr.], the Mercy Plan [introduced in 2006 to teach housewives to be more obedient -- tr.] as well as plans to ban women from work outside the home, and to promote polygamy. Their goal was to force women to stay at home and take care of their husbands for fear that the husband would take another wife.

Furthermore, the government set out to enforce the "Plan to Elevate Public Chastity" which forced all institutions to strictly enforce women's dress codes and the rule against the mixing of women and men in the workplace. The government reduced women's working hours [outside the home -- tr.] to allow them to have more time for family chores. Most important was the "social security plan," the enforcement of which led to harassment and police searches of thousands of women by the Ministry of Culture. Many men were arrested as hooligans and saboteurs, and were taken to unknown places. There are even reports that some were murdered.

The ninth government came to power with the slogans "social justice" and "combating corruption." It did not even elevate social justice and the battle against corruption. The slogan "social justice" was in many cases limited to distributing money and consumer goods among people, without making them economically self-sufficient.

Workers' economic status worsened in all these years. Many workers' organizations were suppressed. Their activists were arrested. The civil rights demands and protests of teachers also faced suppression.

The ninth government set out to dismantle all civil rights organizations by accusing them of getting money from abroad and aiming to create a "soft revolution." Many non-governmental organizations were closed. Their activities were put under severe limitations. Many civil rights activists landed in prison. Newspapers critical [of the regime -- tr.] were banned one after the other. Many journalists lost their jobs or were subjected to harassment by governmental and judicial institutions in one way or another.

Much evidence attests to the increasing level of social dislocation during the past few years. In many urban areas, drug addiction and unemployment are rampant. Analysts attribute this to the government's inept efforts to reduce economic problems. The rates of suicide, homicide, and assaults have increased during the past few years. The roots of most of these phenomena can be traced to economic inequality and to social and gender prejudices.

The ninth government has not left any class or social group unharmed. As a result, all social classes blame the ninth government more than any other government. While it is true that some groups such as women or youth have been subjected to a much greater degree of oppression and prejudice, no class, social or minority group has been left untouched by this government. It is not only the middle class that has suffered. Upper and lower classes, the rural population, bazaris [traditional merchants who have tended to support the clergy -- tr.], and ethnic and religious minorities have all suffered in various ways, and many of them are critical of the government.

Many within the ruling establishment have also criticized the [ninth -- tr.] government during its term in office. It seems that the only ones left unharmed by this government are the minority that the government has enriched as security officials, guards for the existing order, or passive voters. However, the dissatisfied and injured majority protests the results of this election. Perhaps [this majority -- tr.] has by now understood why the ninth government acted confidently and without any concern for people's protests.

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Interesting article about Burqa and how people react!

Bumps on the road towards a burqa ban in France Reuters Blog
Posted by: Tom Heneghan

Remember all the talk about France banning the burqa and niqab Muslim veils for women a few months ago? That project is now in the parliamentary inquiry phase, a six-month fact-finding mission expected to wind up late this year and produce a draft bill to outlaw them. That’s the way France handled it in 2003 when it wanted to stop Muslim girls from wearing headscarves to state schools. But the process seems more complex this time around. There’s less passion and more hesitation in the debate. A smooth progression from the inquiry to the ban and to its implementation no longer looks assured.

To get a feel for the debate, I dropped by the panel’s latest open hearing late on Tuesday and listened to the arguments being made. Five mayors from suburbs with Muslim minorities were due to speak to the panel, which is led by a Communist deputy named André Gerin who makes no bones about his view that a ban is needed. Mayors like these men play a key role in an issue like this, because they are on the front lines dealing with social change and are taken seriously when they clamour for change. Several are also deputies in the National Assembly - France allows them to occupy multiple offices - so they can easily lobby at the national level for something they want.

Sitting alone at the press table in the committee room, I soon saw why the drive towards a ban seems to be hitting some bumps. The mayors don’t know what they want. All think something has to be done, but most are worried that an outright ban wouldn’t work. Here’s my news story on the session.

This was the fifth of 16 hearings planned by the panel, which is officially called the Mission d’information sur la pratique du port du voile intégral sur le territoire national (Fact-finding mission on the practice of wearing the full veil on national territory). They’ve already heard representatives of women’s right groups, spokespeople of associations defending France’s secular system, a Muslim women’s rights advocate and two Muslim intellectuals and they plan to visit the ethnically mixed suburbs of Paris, Lyon, Lille and Marseille. You can often predict what will be said, but not always - some of the militant secularists turned out to be against a burqa ban because it meant the state interfered with personal choice.

To give you a better feel for the debate, here’s a summary of my notes and quotes from the session:

*Claude Dilain, mayor of Clichy-sous-Bois and chairman of the Association of Mayors of French Cities and Suburbs, said “the veil concerns the issue of women’s dignity and it’s clearly a brake on integration”. Within his association, though, “views (about a ban) are divided. Lots of officials are talking about the risks of passing a law. They’re concerned about political and civic risks.”

“Who’ll be responsible for enforcing this law? There’s a lot of concern about this.” France did not necessarily need a law, he said, but “it’s important that the Republic reasserts its values in a strong symbolic manner … It would be a mistake to look at the full veil just from the religious angle. There are socio-economic causes as well. People are taking refuge in identities.”

“We’d have lots of difficulty trying to enforce a law on the ground. Now, the police in Clichy-sous-Bois don’t even issue parking tickets in some areas at some times… There has been a strong rise in religious demands. We mayors can’t be left alone with this. This is happening several times a day. You can’t make a strong statement defending the Republic now without being called an Islamophobe.”

*Jean-Pierre Blazy, mayor of Gonesse north of Paris, admitted: “I’m hesitant. I can’t say today that we need a law. But we shouldn’t just dump the problem on the mayors. We need a firm dialogue to make secularism come alive in this country.” He stressed that he supported the 2004 headscarf ban and was concerned about growing religious demands by Muslims for exceptions to the usual municipal services. “If we have a law, we have to have accompanying measures with it,” he said, to make the measure more palatable to Muslims. One measure he suggested was to teach Arabic in state schools.

*Renaud Gauquelin, mayor of Rillieux-La-Pape near Lyon, said there were very few veiled women in his town but growing problems with Muslim demands in pools, hospitals and schools. On veils, he said: “Is this a regression for the rights of women in France? Certainly. Is there a parallel development for men? No.”

“I’m tending towards a law,” he said, noting that laïcité, the legal separation of church and state, was written into the constitution, as were women’s rights, and failing to ban the veil would amount to a failure to defend those rights. “What sign would we give to women around the world? To Iranian women fighting for their freedom? To Saudi women who want to be able to drive a car?”

*Jean-Yves Le Bouillonnec, mayor of Cachan south of Paris, thought existing laws would be enough to deal with the burqa issue. “If we pass a law, how would we enforce it? What would the sanctions be for violating it? There could be no worse message to send than to pass a law and tell people to obey it without saying they will be punished for not obeying it… I can’t see a ban working. It’s extremely complex and almost completely inapplicable.”

He suggested the National Assembly might want to pass a strong resolution reaffirming republican principles.

*Xavier Lemoine, mayor of Montfermeil east of Paris, said some Muslims in his town were becoming “reislamised” and this was visible in a rise in veil wearing and pressure some Muslims put on co-religionists who don’t fast during Ramadan. “It’s not always in the poorer areas, but also in the middle class areas that you see these demands,” he said. He noted that the full veil was not required by the Koran “but it’s in the Sunnah”, France had to take a strong position against the veil and understand how Islam was different from Western traditions. “In Judeo-Christian society, the individual is predominant. In the Muslim world, the individual exists through belonging to a community. The weight of the community is terrible.” At the same time, officials should separate Islam from its fundamentalist fringe when analysing religious issues.

Still, he was also hesitant about voting for a ban. “I prefer to do nothing for a good reason than something for a bad reason.”

Several panel members had questions or observations for the invited mayors.

*André Gerin, a Communist deputy, head of the fact-finding panel and former mayor of Venissieux suburb of Lyon, called full veils “medieval customs spread by salafists”. The veil was the I in an Islamisation drive by radical Muslims. Gerin said France should not only consider a ban on full veils but also go after “the gurus” who are not in these neighbourhoods but are spoiling everything”. (BTW Gerin gave no details about who he meant by “gurus”, a term usually used by Hindus and Sikhs. But they call all full veils burqas, using the Afghan term, even though almost all of them worn here are Arab-style niqabs. Go figure.)

*Jean Glavany, a Socialist deputy, said fundamentalism was part of all religions these days. “This idea of separating the fundamentalists from the religion doesn’t work. To say that fundamentalist excesses have nothing to do with the religion is like saying hooliganism has nothing to do with football or doping has nothing to do with the Tour de France.”

“We should refuse to make legislators into exegetists.”

*Jacques Myard, conservative UMP deputy and mayor of Maisons-Lafitte northwest of Paris, warned against turning into a “soft democracy” that could not stand up for its own values. He argued for a ban with punishments for violators. “Sanctions have to be rehabilitated. Not cutting off of heads and hands, of course. But this is the order of things in a structured society with its own values. It has to be respected. They can’t impose their personal order.”

“Is Islam compatible with laïcité? That’s not my problem. It’s not for us to decide if it’s compatible, it’s up to them. In the Muslim world, you find all kinds of interpretations. It’s not our role to solve this.”

Understanding the French approach to its Muslim minority has often proved difficult for outsiders. Does this make it any clearer?

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Les héros enchaînés-1

Recherches sur les prisons du régime des mollahs

Ces recherches ont été effectuée de 1996 à 2001 auprès des familles des exécutés politiques et sur la situation dans les prisons en Iran par l'organisation des Moudjahidine du peuple (OMPI).

Viol

Dans les prisons du régime iranien, il y a eu de nombreux cas de viol de jeunes filles et de femmes en particulier au cours des interrogatoires. Elaheh Daknama, une lycéenne sympathisante des Moudjahidine, arrêtée à Chiraz, a été violée durant sa détention. Après son exécution, quand sa famille a récupéré ses affaires, elle avait écrit sur ses vêtements qu’elle avait été violée à sept reprises.

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Iranian girls defy the anti-Iranian Mullahs by music

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Iranian women on the frontline of protests

For years, women's defiance in Iran came in carefully planned flashes of hair under their head scarves, brightly painted fingernails and trendy clothing that could be glimpsed under bulky coats and cloaks.

But these small acts of rebellion against the theocratic government have been quickly eclipsed in the wake of the disputed June 12 presidential elections. In their place came images of Iranian women marching alongside men, of their scuffles with burly militiamen, of the sobering footage of a young woman named Neda, blood pouring from her mouth and nose minutes after her fatal shooting.

In a part of the Muslim world where women are often repressed, these images have catapulted Iran's female demonstrators to the forefront of the country's opposition movement. It is a role, say Iranian women and experts, that few seem willing to give up, and one that will likely present President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's hardline government with even greater challenges in the wake of the recent violence and protests.

Shoulder to shoulder with men
Across the Muslim Middle East, women have often joined men in protest movements.
When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, women took part in street demonstrations in the tiny Gulf country. Over the years, images of Palestinian women, fists raised in anger against Israel and tears flowing in despair over children and husbands killed, have become a staple of that conflict.

But Iran's protests have elevated such images to a new level.

While Iranian women have been politically active in the past, coming out in large numbers in support of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the latest demonstrations showed them standing shoulder-to-shoulder with their male counterparts, enduring the same blows and threats.

"We were all together, and we helped each other despite our sexuality, and we will be together," said one 34-year-old Tehran woman who is active in the protests.

Images of Neda linger
They have also given the movement some of its most high-profile arrests — former President Hashemi Rasfanjani's 46-year-old activist daughter — and its first martyr, Neda Agha Soltan.

Soltan, who was allegedly shot by pro-government militia as she walked through a protest Saturday, became the public face of the government's repression — a female martyr in a culture that celebrates such symbols, but usually relegates women to the role of the martyr's mother or wife.

Video images of Soltan lying on the street, blood pouring from her mouth and nose as a few men crouch down, struggling to save her, quickly made their way onto the Internet. From there, they bounced around the world.

"She represents this youth who went there with such hope and idealism," said Ziba Mir-Hosseini, who researches the situation of women in Iran, at the University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies. "In a way, she is the first woman martyr. She is a martyr for democracy."

President Barack Obama on Tuesday summed it up as such: "We have seen courageous women stand up to brutality and threats, and we have experienced the searing image of a woman bleeding to death on the streets."

In the convoluted, and fluid, calculus of Iranian politics, it remains to be seen how the government will deal with these challenges. Also unclear is how these developments will shape policy.

Under previous reformist regimes, Iranian women secured a wink-and-a-nod attitude from the government that allowed them to adopt more casual hair coverings and more freedoms than those seen in other conservative Muslim countries in the region, such as Saudi Arabia.

Breaking taboos
Although they are barred from the presidency and religious posts, many Iranian women are in parliament and other political offices. About 65 percent of university students are women.

In 2006, a group of women launched a campaign to gather a million signatures in favor of equal rights for women. And, in the run-up to the presidential election, a coalition of women from diverse economic and social classes worked to ensure that the candidates focused their platforms on efforts to improve women's lives.

Mousavi's bid for the presidency further encouraged them, with women buoyed in no small part by his progressive stance on women's issues and his unorthodox — at least for Iran — campaign appearances alongside his wife, Zahra Rahnavard.

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Interview with Isobel Coleman on Iranian women !

After reading this interview I became more apt on the fact that the Obama administration is incapable of comprehending or the least of dealing with the Iranian regime! It is too simply vivid that when backed by such irresponsible thinktanks, the outcomes of foreign policy of the US is heartbreaking when it comes to Iran

follow the "UPdated" position of the Foreign affairs on women in Iran and their role in the uprising there.

Interviewee:	Isobel Coleman, Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy, CFR
Interviewer:	Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, CFR.org

In the demonstrations following the disputed election in Iran, there were many women on the streets. There were reports that the women were, in fact, goading the men to be more bold. We know there's been a women's reform movement. Was this election seen by women as a key election to further women's rights?

The reform movement and the women's movement in Iran are definitely and clearly interrelated. The women have been a key component of the reform movement since its very beginning. There have been women who have focused their reform effort specifically on improving legal rights for women and day-to-day livability for women. But they have worked alongside reformers who are focused on big-picture issues of democracy and human rights. Over time the two have merged. You've seen leading reformers going back to the 1990s taking on women's issues as part of their discourse, just as women have taken on human rights and democracy as part of their discourse. The two have really been intermingled over the past twenty years.

Are Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad seen by the women's groups as anti-reform and anti-women's improvement?

Yes, I would say so definitely. Over the last four years, Ahmadinejad has overseen a crackdown on women, particularly with a much stricter enforcement of the dress code for women. There were various "spring cleaning" waves that ran through Tehran over the last few years where authorities rounded up literally thousands of women for dress code violations, such as too much hair showing and the wrong outer garment. The regime has arrested many women and used force on women who have peacefully demonstrated in city squares around Iran for more rights. Last fall, the conservative parliament that was encouraged by Ahmadinejad put forth an even more aggressive family code that would have taken women backwards, such as loosening up restrictions on polygamy and making it harder for women to get a divorce. They called it the Family Protection Act, but women could clearly see it was to their detriment. Women's groups organized multiple campaigns last summer to make women aware of what was going on and to show them that this wasn't even consistent with Islamic law. The bill was not passed. Ayatollah Yousef Sanei came out from Qom very much against this Family Protection Act, calling it anti-women, against the ideals of the revolution, and anti-Islamic.

Is Mir-Hossein Mousavi much stronger on women's rights?

We don't know exactly where he stands on some of these issues, but what we do know is that he has a very prominent wife, Zahra Rahnavard, whose independence and prominence preceded his. She was a very well-known academic who played a very active role in the campaign. It was unprecedented to see a power couple campaigning in the way that they have. Over the last several months, she's held rallies and spoken out very much in the way that we're used to in the American context of a first lady playing an active role. She made statements on the need to respect women's rights, so we could anticipate that women would have a better hearing under a Mousavi presidency than an Ahmadinejad presidency. In fact, in the last several days, as the crackdown on the reformers has become more intense, we have heard little from Moussavi himself, but Zahra continues to be out in front, publicly rallying protesters and defying the regime.

Another woman who's featured prominently is Faezeh Rafsanjani, the daughter of former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who is a strong supporter of Mousavi. She was briefly arrested. Is she well-known in Iranian society?

She is very well-known. The bigger question is where would Rafsanjani be himself on women and women's rights? When he was president of Iran, he was no liberal. In fact, he himself oversaw a pretty strict interpretation of women's dress code and several restrictive policies on women. However, he took some steps to begin to normalize a role for women within the regime. One of the most prominent things he did was to promote his daughter, Faezeh Rafsanjani, to be the head of the Iranian Sports Council and launched a whole bid to allow women to participate in athletic activities in public. This had been disallowed after the revolution. She really rose to prominence on this issue. She was then elected to parliament in the fifth Majlis [1996-2000] but disappointed some women reformers at that time who were looking for women in parliament to take on an active role for women and reform issues. She was not reelected to the sixth Majlis, but since then we've seen her become an increasingly outspoken reformer, particularly on women's issues. She herself has been leading protests and was arrested over the weekend. From this, you can infer that she's come a long way in her own thinking on the connection between women's rights and reform in Iran.

Talk a bit about this phenomenon that occurred on Saturday when this young woman, Neda Agha Soltan, was killed. Is her death likely to become a part of Iranian hagiography?

It already has. Neda is already known by her first name. Her name is known around the world. She's become an iconic symbol of the struggle for greater freedom and justice. From what I understand, she was an innocent bystander who was just standing there and shot dead. She's really become an image that people will cling to for a long time in Iran.

It seems to me an interesting paradox: Women in Iran traditionally have the law against them yet there are more women in the universities and more women graduates. They seem to be outpacing the men. Clearly, in education at least, there really isn't that much discrimination. Am I wrong?

There's blatant legal discrimination in Iran against women, but the reality of women's lives is very advanced. Iran is not like other countries. Women are highly educated and most have jobs. It's not uncommon to see women as taxi drivers in Iran, while that would certainly turn heads in America. Women are pilots. There's a prominent woman who is a race car driver. There are women on television, women who are artists and who play a large role in the film industry in Iran. There are women members of parliament and two women have been vice presidents. Despite all of this, there [are] still pretty significant legal restrictions against women. That contradiction reflects the inherent contradictions of the regime itself. Ayatollah Ali Khomeini called women out from their homes--women who had never left their homes before--to come demonstrate in the streets in support of the revolution in 1978-79. And they did. They played a very important role in mobilizing popular support in the revolution. When the laws were changed to restrict many of their rights, a lot of the women started to think that "this isn't what we expected." I'm talking about conservative women, not the liberal, educated elite. They began to question what the revolution really meant for them. They, along with their daughters, have formed the backbone of the reform movement and protests you see across Iran today.

Have you been in touch with any Iranian women throughout all of this?

Yes. There's been a real shift in the past couple of days. People are scared. There's been a crackdown and they're all reluctant to go out on the streets. They see themselves as vulnerable when they see and hear about arrests and violence. It's a very frightening and unknown time right now.

If the status quo remains and Ahmadinejad remains president, does this have a direct impact on women?

It will have a direct impact in that you'll see a much more restricted Iran--more than what we've seen in the past few years. To squash what has happened in the last couple of weeks will take force and a very heavy hand. This will ultimately fall heavily on women, but it won't stop them. They've been through this before. What has changed now, so dramatically, is that the regime has no moral authority anymore. In the past, when women demonstrated, they were labeled as Zionist spies, American stooges, and enthralled to Western secular liberalism and feminism. Those sneers no longer work. These are traditional, conservative women who are saying this is enough. They will not be stopped, and their demands won't be silenced for more justice. This is why the regime fears them so much.

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Ten Days that Shook Iran

By:Noushin Ahmadi Khorasani-iranpressnews site

The protests have now nearly died down, but the demonstrations that erupted in response to the fraudulent results of Iran’s 10th presidential election did not fail to bear fruit. The protests, and the powerful people’s movement for a democratic Iran, changed the country as much in 10 days as all movements combined did in the previous 10 years.

The size and success of the Iranian people’s movement was not exclusively the consequence of an unjust election result. The Iranian government, like many of the world’s governments, had been weakened by the global recession, and, as such, Iranian citizens were more dissatisfied and more ready to protest than they might have been otherwise.

The climate of economic crisis, in combination with the electoral fraud, brought to the surface the longstanding, deep-rooted problems and contradictions in the structure of the regime. The people’s movement capitalized on this mood, participating in the election, publicly questioning and lobbying the candidates. Reformist politicians such as Mir-Hossein Mousavi, sensing the cracks in the status quo, were responsive to the movement, which in turn buoyed the people. This reinforced a hopefulness among Iranians, without which no positive change can be achieved.

Before the election, the role of the women’s movement in particular was to communicate issues to the presidential candidates and the society at large. The extraordinary coalition forged by numerous women’s rights groups continued in effect after the election and took it upon itself to explain and analyse events as they unfolded. The resistance was not organized overnight, and it was sustained with the involvement of the students’ movement and the independent trade unions. Together we made sure the public was aware of what was happening and was reminded of their rights. After 30 years of decorative elections, this time around we made sure to have our say. And we did have our say, which is why parts of the regime reacted with violence.

The role of women in the current struggle for democracy is disticly different from that during the 1979 revolution, when women activists participated in the broader struggle against the Shah and did not highlight women’s rights issues specifically. As a result, women lost out. In the current struggle we are determined to highlight women’s issues and women’s rights as critical and distinct components of the struggle for democracy.

The events following last month’s election constitute the largest civil and democratic movement Iran has seen in the past 30 years. The vastness of this movement is proof that Iranian society, and the suppressed in particular, are hungry for democracy. The struggle was not between religious forces and non-religious, or between Muslim and secular, but between the people and a government that does not represent them.

The movement is comprised of the whole “modern middle-class” of Iran. All these people, both religious and secular among them, want to have a say in their political destiny.

Moving forward, we need to keep our message alive. We want true democracy in Iran. We need to continue educating the masses so they will peacefully resist the violence of the state. We must teach our children, the young generation, never to forget our history of struggle, and we must explain to them that justice and equality can best be realized through patience and tolerance.

Iran is our common home, with all its socio-political variances, and we must refrain from violence. Short-term victories are not an option. We know we have a long struggle ahead, as culture and tradition and politics change slowly. If Ghandi was able to achieve victory by peaceful means after so much suppression and violence, if Martin Luther King was able to peacefully stand alongside his people against racism, then us Iranians can move forward without violence, slowly but surely, towards our dream of a democratic nation.

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